Sustainability Challenges of the European Society and Higher Education by Vértesy, László
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Sustainability Challenges of the
European Society and Higher Education
La´szlo´ Ve´rtesy
World Council for Curriculum and Instruction
2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88645/
MPRA Paper No. 88645, posted 26 August 2018 07:03 UTC
 Author: László VÉRTESY PhD jur. PhD œc. 
 
Published: in Saba Senses-Ozyurt, Sándor Klein and Zsolt Nemeskéri –ed.: Educating for 
Democratic Governance and Global Citizenship. World Council for Curriculum and 
Instruction San Diego,CA, USA 2016. pp. 251-267. ISBN 978-0-692-69768-9;  
URL: 
http://kpvk.pte.hu/sites/kpvk.pte.hu/files/files/EKONYVEK/wcci_final_160629.pdf  
 
 
Sustainability Challenges  
of the European Society and Higher Education 
 
Abstract 
The paper analyses – with an aggregate method – the present demographic and higher education 
situation of the European Union, the consequences, which can be drawn, and the possible options. A 
sustainable society and higher education is functional, far-sighted, maintainable for generations, 
flexible and wise enough to do not destroy its physical, environmental or social service systems. 
Looking at demographics is perhaps one of the best ways to analyse the sustainability of these 
systems, because the actual size of education is in strong connection with society. In the case of higher 
education these topics are relevant because, putting aside the theory of lifelong learning, a well-
functioning education system still need youngsters, students. If demographic policy is successful, the 
effects will only be felt after one generation, and at least twice as many time is required for 
maintaining the present higher education system. The most pressing and urgent question is bridging 
the next two or three decades. 
 
Introduction 
In generally a sustainable society and (higher) education system is functional, far-sighted, 
maintainable for generations, flexible and wise enough to do not destroy its physical, environmental 
or social service systems. Demography and the sustainability of education are in a strong connection, 
because it is unconceivable and impossible without the necessary human resource: students. 
Therefore, basically looking at demographics is perhaps one of the best ways to analyse the 
sustainability of the society and populace in widely, and higher education in a narrower way. 
Demography is the science of vital social statistics, such as the births, deaths, diseases, marriages, 
etc., of a population. Formal demography limits its object of study to the measurement of population 
processes, while the broader field of social demography or population studies also analyses the 
relationships between economic, social, cultural and biological processes influencing a population. 
The current demography of the European Union is actually resultant of the Member States’ 
demographies, where each positive and negative result should be considered as an aggregated whole. 
 
Present Situation 
In 2015 approximately 500 million people live in the 28 member countries of the European Union. 
According to the estimates of the future, if circumstances do not change significantly (!), 517 million 
people will live in 2060 in this region.  However, it is important to point out that any subsequent 
accessions (especially Turkey) or exceptional withdrawals, or exclusions might fundamentally affect 
these trends. The absolute population growth results by the accessions are spectacular at first, but the 
positive or negative movement sign of the relative percentage rate (%) is more able to express, that 
actually how the demography of a society increases or decreases. 
 The age pyramids, fertility rates and the increase of life expectancy all demonstrate these inequalities 
(Eurostat, 2013 and Eurostat 2010). Using a dendrological metaphor, if we regard these pyramids as 
trees, a healthy society shows an evergreen tree, where the number and rate of younger generation is 
ever increasing. An aging population however resembles the crown of a deciduous tree, where the 
older generation is predominant staying without an adequate further supply of young generations. 
Unfortunately, this latter phenomenon can be observed in the European Union.  
 
Table 1 
Demographic indexes of the Member States of the EU in 2015 
Country Population EU % Children 
per 
woman 
Relative 
growth 
(%) 
Absolute 
growth 
Life 
expectancy 
(year) 
Austria 8 623 000 1,70 1,44 0,71 61 000 80,5 
Belgium 11 253 000 2,22 1,75 0,51 57 000 80,0 
Bulgaria 7 181 000 1,42 1,48 -0,60 -43 000 74,5 
Croatia 4 230 000 0,83 1,46 -0,31 -13 000 77,1 
Cyprus 846 000 0,17 1,30 -0,94 -8 000 81,7 
Czech Republic 10 536 000 2,08 1,46 -0,06 -6 000 77,5 
Denmark 5 678 000 1,12 1,67 0,48 27 000 79,6 
Estonia 1 315 000 0,26 1,52 0,46 6 000 76,7 
Finland 5 477 000 1,08 1,75 0,46 25 000 80,3 
France 67 063 000 13,23 1,99 0,45 288 000 81,7 
Germany 81 276 000 16,03 1,39 0,32 256 000 80,2 
Greece 10 769 000 2,12 1,29 -0,11 -12 000 80,6 
Hungary 9 835 000 1,94 1,35 -0,28 -28 000 75,2 
Ireland 4 630 000 0,91 1,96 0,35 16 000 80,3 
Italy 60 851 000 12,00 1,39 0,48 290 000 82,1 
Latvia 1 980 000 0,39 1,52 -0,85 -17 000 73,7 
Lithuania 2 903 000 0,57 1,59 -0,92 -27 000 73,4 
Luxembourg 570 000 0,11 1,55 2,52 14 000 81,2 
Malta 425 000 0,08 1,38 0,47 2 000 81,4 
Netherlands 16 924 000 3,34 1,68 0,36 60 000 80,7 
Poland 38 494 000 7,59 1,29 0,05 20 000 76,5 
Portugal 10 318 000 2,04 1,21 -0,55 -57 000 80,1 
Romania 19 822 000 3,91 1,41 -0,41 -81 000 74,9 
Slovakia 5 425 000 1,07 1,34 0,13 7 000 76,0 
Slovenia 2 064 000 0,41 1,55 0,15 3 000 79,7 
Spain 46 404 000 9,15 1,27 -0,15 -72 000 82,4 
Sweden 9 793 000 1,93 1,89 0,95 92 000 81,2 
United Kingdom 65 093 000 12,90 1,83 0,77 495 000 80,4 
Total/average 507 010 000 100 1,55 0,27 1 355 000 79,9 
Source: Eurostat, 2016 
 
  
 Table 2 
Children and young people in the population, EU-28, 1994, 2004 and 2014 
  1994 2004 2014 
  Populatio
n 
(thousand
s) 
Shar
e  
(%) 
Populatio
n 
(thousand
s) 
Shar
e  
(%) 
Populatio
n 
(thousand
s) 
Shar
e  
(%) 
Children  
(0–14 years) 
88 628  18,6  80 724  16,4  79 106  15,6  
Young people (15–29 years) 104 574  22,0  97 219  19,7  89 634  17,7  
Children and young people (0–29 
years) 
193 202  40,6  177 944  36,1  168 740  33,3  
 
Figure 1 
Population pyramids, EU-28, 1994 and 2014 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2016 
 
Figure 2 
Age structure of the national and non-national populations, EU-28, 2014 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2016  
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 Figure 3 
The fertility rates per women of the Member States of the EU 
 
Source: Eurostat and OECD: Society at a Glance 2012. 
 
The number of willingness to have children and the number of births dropped to a level that no longer 
assures the reproduction of the European population. The number of live-born children per woman 
should be between a minimum of 2.1 to 2.3, in order to maintain a society, notably the European 
(Cseh-Szombathy, 2006). However, among the 28 Member States there are still only 11 countries 
where the population is decreasing, which is a result of non-EU immigration. In the most populous 
countries (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy) the relative demographic values are between 
0.32 and 0.77 %, mainly as a result of immigration, which is largely able to offset the lower results 
of the other countries. The immigrants’ attainment in tertiary education is complicated, usually the 
members of the first immigrant generation are at the working age and they have enough qualifications 
to take suitable initial jobs. Then the youngsters of the next generation will study later in the tertiary 
education, depending on the income conditions of the certain immigrant family.  
Overall, the annual relative demographic growth is small, but remains still positive (only 0.27 %), 
which represents more than 1.3 million people per a year. The results are also improved by the 
standard of living, as in the European Union the mortality rate is low and because of life expectancy 
at birth is also high, with an average of 79.9 years, in Spain this number is 82.4 years, while the lowest 
is 73.4 years in Lithuania. With connections with this, it is also worth to point out the observation 
that after a decrease in mortality eventually a declining in fertility starts as well, since many families 
lose interest in having numerous children for several reasons (Andorka, 1987). If we compare these 
numbers with the age pyramids, then according to a simple calculation (dependency rate) now there 
are four employees per a person over 65 years, but this figure will be reduced to two by 2060. As a 
result, it seems clear that in the future there will not be sufficient and adequate social and economic 
resources available for the welfare states to organize, manage and provide public services, notably 
(not just) higher education and social insurance. 
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 Figure 4 
The number of employees per elderly persons in the EU 
 
Source: Eurostat, and EU-Commission, Ageing Report 2015. 
The EU statistics show that very few children are born among the current European 25-40 year-old 
persons. The fertility rate and the birth rate (natality) are very low: 1.55 children per a woman in the 
EU28. (The women of childbearing age are members of the population between the ages of 15-49.) 
Unfortunately, there is no Member State in which it would be over two. In addition, however, this 
value shows a continuous downward trend in recent years. In accordance with the increasing tertiary 
educational attainment of women, the mean age of women at childbirth continued to rise between 
2001 and 2014, from 29.0 to 30.4 years. 
 
Figure 5-7 
Title Total fertility rate and Mean age of women at childbirth 
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Source: Eurostat, 2016 
 
The income level has also a crucial role in the willingness to have children. The average monthly 
income of an EU citizens was € 1,509 in 2014; however the difference between incomes very greatly 
between member states: in Luxembourg € 3,186, in Sweden € 2,690, in the United Kingdom € 2,597, 
while in Romania € 398 and Bulgaria € 333, and in Hungary € 503 (Reinisfischer, 2014). This nearly 
tenfold income difference also has an effect on the number of live births per woman, since this value 
is 1.89 in of the UK, and 1.83 in Sweden, while only 1.41 in Romania and 1.35 in Hungary. 
Furthermore it is worth to be, that during the tertiary education period the youngsters usually can take 
only part time jobs, therefore the monthly incomes are lower, which makes the willingness 
willingness to have children more difficult. 
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 Table 3 
Number of tertiary education students by level and sex, 2013 
  Tertiary total SHORT BA MA  PHD 
  Total Male Female Total Total Total Total 
Eu-28 19 632,3  8 969,1  10 663,2  1 475,4  11 913,5  5 507,4  736,0  
Belgium 488,5  216,3  272,2  24,1  364,2  85,6  14,6  
Bulgaria 284,0  129,1  154,9  –  195,6  83,0  5,4  
Czech Rep. 427,4  182,0  245,4  1,0  267,7  133,5  25,2  
Denmark 291,1  125,5  165,7  31,7  182,3  67,5  9,6  
Germany 2 780,0  1 469,9  1 310,1  0,5  1 635,9  930,4  213,2  
Estonia 64,8  26,9  37,9  –  44,8  17,0  3,0  
Ireland 199,4  98,8  100,6  41,6  121,2  28,4  8,2  
Greece 659,3  337,7  321,6  –  588,2  48,1  23,0  
Spain 1 969,4  914,8  1 054,6  346,4  1 085,0  514,4  23,7  
France 2 338,1  1 062,6  1 275,6  504,9  931,7  832,0  69,5  
Croatia 164,6  71,7  92,9  :  102,8  58,2  3,6  
Italy 1 872,7  804,1  1 068,5  2,5  1 108,3  727,0  34,9  
Cyprus 32,0  14,3  17,7  3,3  20,0  7,9  0,8  
Latvia 94,5  38,7  55,7  17,3  63,3  11,3  2,5  
Lithuania 159,7  66,4  93,2  –  124,5  32,5  2,7  
Luxembourg 6,6  3,2  3,4  0,3  3,4  2,4  0,5  
Hungary 359,0  160,9  198,1  37,0  237,6  77,0  7,3  
Malta 12,6  5,6  7,0  2,5  6,9  3,1  0,1  
Netherlands 674,8  327,1  347,7  5,3  558,5  97,3  13,6  
Austria 422,8  196,8  225,9  76,8  180,2  140,1  25,7  
Poland 1 902,7  764,6  1 138,1  10,9  1 266,5  583,0  42,3  
Portugal 371,0  173,7  197,3  –  231,5  120,0  19,5  
Romania 618,2  284,9  333,2  –  409,6  187,2  21,4  
Slovenia 97,7  41,5  56,2  13,4  54,9  25,8  3,6  
Slovakia 209,5  84,5  125,0  2,9  120,8  74,9  11,0  
Finland 309,0  143,1  165,9  0,1  228,3  60,1  20,6  
Sweden 436,6  176,0  260,6  26,0  253,0  136,1  21,5  
United Kingdom 2 386,2  1 048,0  1 338,2  326,8  1 526,7  423,6  109,1  
Iceland 19,1  7,2  11,9  0,5  13,8  4,4  0,5  
Liechtenstein 0,8  0,6  0,3  –  0,5  0,2  0,1  
Norway 255,4  105,2  150,2  9,8  181,9  56,3  7,4  
Switzerland 279,8  141,3  138,5  10,8  186,3  60,0  22,7  
Macedonia 60,7  27,6  33,1  –  56,9  3,6  0,2  
Turkey 4 975,7  2 706,9  2 268,8  1 527,7  3 052,7  314,8  80,5  
Source: Eurostat, 2016 
  
 Figure 8 
Population (%) aged 30-34 with tertiary educational attainment, EU-28, 2005-14 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2016 
 
It is interesting that the share of 30 to 34 year-old persons who have attained tertiary education has 
continuously increased since 2005, from 27.5 % to 37.9 % in 2014. In accordance with knowledge 
based society concept of the European Union, it seems that the EU be on track to meet its target which 
is to increase this share to at least 40 % by 2020. However, the shares of men and women are 
converging towards the target at different paces, and according to this trends some analyses forecast 
more than target rate in 2020. Data show that the growth of tertiary graduates has been considerably 
faster for women (the result was 42.3 % in 2014), and in strong connection with this, the mean age 
of women at childbirth has been increased. This progress is slower for men, by 2014 only 33.6 % of 
them had attained tertiary education. 
 
Figure 9 
Distribution of tertiary graduates by field and sex, EU-28, 2013 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2016 
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 In most of the tertiary graduate fields, the majority of women is obvious. Only engineering, 
manufacturing, construction, science, mathematics and computing are the areas where men have 
surplus. The most significant rearrangement can be observed in the case of social sciences, economics 
and law.  
The strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training adopted in May 2009 
sets a number of benchmarks to be achieved by 2020, including one for lifelong learning, namely that 
an average of at least 15 % of adults aged 25 to 64 years old should participate in lifelong learning. 
Lifelong learning can take place in a variety of environments, both inside and outside formal 
education and training systems. The economic crisis, the need for new skills and the demographic 
changes facing Europe have highlighted the role that adult learning may play in lifelong learning 
strategies, contributing towards policies that seek to boost competitiveness, employability, social 
inclusion and active citizenship: a framework for education and training (ET 2020) 
 
Figure 10 
Participation in life-long learning, EU-28 (% of population aged 25 to 64) 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2016 
 
 
Consequences and options 
The aging of European society bears numerous negative consequences. (The median age of the 
population in 1990 was 35,2 and in 2014 it was 42,1) According to statistical methodology the age 
group over 65 is not considered to be an employee, so they no longer significantly contribute to public 
burdens. Therefore, it will be more and more difficult that fewer and fewer workers, taxpayers will 
finance the public services e.g. education and social insurance services as well. Of course, in the case 
of a (Scandinavic) welfare-based fully funded social security this is not a problem, but not all the EU 
countries operate this system. The post-communist Member States applied only the pay-as-you-go 
system until 1990, and after the political changes the social security reforms – with this in mind – 
were mostly fragmentary (for example the imposition of compulsory private insurance forms) and 
the past 25 years was (would) not enough for the required amount of capital formation.  
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 Figure 11 
Population structure by major age groups, EU-28, 2014–80 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2016 
 
The biggest problem of the EU's demography is the structure of society: the population is aging 
significantly, the proportion of the people over 65 years is 17 %, by 2080 this figure will rise to more 
than 29 %. The unfavourable reversal of the proportion of employees and older persons combined 
with scarce resources will force the decision-makers to make choices. Today’s generation of children 
are facing an increased burden in relation to supporting the remainder of the population as they move 
into work (Eurostat, 2015).  This might force the state to reduce the level of public duties, possibly 
relinquish the supply of certain public functions or provide funding from other sources. The OECD 
already highlighted this problem in 1988, according to the pre-estimates between 1980-2040 due to 
the expected demographic changes the costs of healthcare will rise by nearly 40 %, and of pensions 
by 80 %, while the expenditures related to public education will be reduced by almost 20 %, and 
family supports by about 15 % (OECD, 1988).  
 
Figure 12 
The European Union's population 
 
*Brown: population change with migration; Yellow: population change without migration; Source: 
Eurostat, EU-Commission, Ageing Report 2015. 
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 In relation to migration some facts and statements are important to present here. The immigration 
does not mean a clear solution for educated labour force, because according to educational figures 
the foreign-born residents have a higher tendency to abandon formal education prematurely. In the 
EU, the share of early leavers among migrants in 2013 was more than twice as high as for natives 
(22.6 % compared with 11 %). In accordance with immigration it is also worth mentioning, that the 
high proportion of foreign human resource – as some events (e.g. terrorist attacks) of the recent past 
highlighted – can cause a potential security risk (Danish Ministry of Justice, 2007). In addition, the 
international treaties, conventions and EU standards, and domestic legislations do not allow positive 
discrimination on geographical or professional qualification, educational backgrounds amongst 
foreigners. 
The less financial resources for public education will occur rearrangements in the tertiary 
education, since the less state supports, scholarships will lead, that only the wealthier segment of the 
society will be able to finance the costs and expenditures of academic education. So at universities 
there will be two types of students: one, the wealthier youngsters (18-25 years) whose educational 
expenditures are financed by their family, and the others who can finance themselves from their own 
incomes (25-35 years). According to the present trend, the demand for (higher) educated labour force 
in later will be more and more important. For a successful career the need for higher and specialised 
knowledge will be more and more indispensable necessary. Education is getting to transform rather 
to a long-term financial investment project. In addition, the student credit systems will increase, and 
as a consequence of this, the banking system will adopt to this new potential client, borrower and 
debtor base.  
Economic challenges are also political challenges at the same time, because the government's 
economic policy will have to choose from to the former options. These rearrangements can be 
observed in political life as well, while the suffrage of the older age group remains, whom form a 
homogeneous voting group, for them maintaining and increasing the quality of public services for the 
elderly can be an election rallying call. Only that political force will win their vote, which focuses on 
these problems and will continue to provide the current and expected standard of living in old age. 
 
Figure 13 
Public expenditure on education as a share of GDP 2012 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2016 
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Other education Tertiary
 The public expenditure on education as a rate of GDP slightly increased in the EU, from 5.0 % in 
2008 to 5.3 % in 2012. This average figure conceals considerable cross-country variations in the 
allocation of public resources for education, ranging from 2.6 % in Romania to 8.8 % in Denmark in 
2012.  The Scarcity of public funds always a challenge for public education. The recent financial 
crisis showed also, that the education systems across the EU have been affected differently by the 
recession. While 11 countries have managed to keep their spending on education at a higher or 
comparable level in absolute terms from 2008 to 2011, cuts in education expenditure were significant 
during this period in Estonia, Ireland, Latvia and Hungary as well as in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and 
Romania, where spending levels in relation to the GDP were already low and have been cut further. 
The European Commission considers the fall in education spending in recent years in these Member 
States a worrying trend calling for strengthening the efficiency of education investment and 
supporting innovation and competitiveness. This is of particular relevance in the context of limited 
GDP growth forecasts for 2014.  
According the international, geopolitical challenges of the European Union, to maintain and improve 
educational attainment is very important. Low educational attainment, under educated labour force is 
usually negatively linked with competiveness, standard of living, quality of life and other 
socioeconomic variables e.g. employment, unemployment and the risk of poverty or social exclusion. 
(Eurostat 2015) Low-educated young people face particularly severe problems in the labour market, 
unemployment levels among early leavers from education and training are much higher than among 
the total population of the same age group, since it is becoming more difficult for them to find work. 
Unfortunately, young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET status: Not 
in Education, Employment, or Training) face later a high risk of being excluded from the labour 
market and becoming dependent on state benefits supports, allowances, aids. In 2013, the NEET rate 
for 18 to 24 year old women were 17.4 %, with more than half (54.6 %) being economically inactive. 
At the same time, the NEET rate for men of the same age group was 16.6 %, but almost two-thirds 
(63.9 %) were unemployed. For a disappointing example, in a number of Member States the 
proportion of pupils dropping out early or even not attending school at all is especially high among 
ethnic minority groups, such as Roma. In 2011 more than 10 % of Roma children were not attending 
compulsory education in Romania, Bulgaria, France and Italy, and this figure reached 35 % in Greece 
(European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2012. p. 14.). 
To solve the demographic and resource problems there are numerous economic and/or social policy 
options. Within this context, the European Commission sets out four main objectives: reversing the 
process of early retirement, encouraging old-age retirement, maintenance of the social security 
systems, creating an information society for a meaningful and active old age (Farkas & Gyarmati & 
Molnár, 2009). For the Government's economic policy it is a not very popular option to relinquish 
some public services, and leave it to the society to self-finance its needs from its savings. It is also an 
unfortunate choice to decrease the standard of quality. However, the austerity measures will also 
occur along the (economic) policy preferences, and probably the measures will not affect the elderly’s 
public needs (inflation adjusted pension valorisation, pharmaceutical subsidies), but rather other 
public functions (child protection, public education etc.). A further inept solution is the involvement 
of foreign funds, which – since consumed fully – is a clear example of the sovereign debt trap. (See 
also Hungary during the Goulash Communism decades.) It is another defective opportunity to raise 
the retirement age, which increases the number of employees on the labour market and the – the still 
high, average 10 % – unemployment rate in the EU (OECD, 2002). Also due to the increase of public 
revenues, in particular social security revenues the tax burden and labour costs also get higher, which 
can also lead to unemployment (Bedy 2011). These above mentioned trends focus only on financing 
the European welfare states, but they do not improve European (!) population growth. 
The relationship between financial and social resources is close, so to be able to continue the current 
level of welfare and standard of living the state needs more tax revenues, namely more taxpayers and 
a productive workforce (EU Quarterly Review 2013). This arises the argument to “import” skilled 
 workers from third countries, since in parallel with the increased production the public revenues rise 
also. Therefore at least at a statistics level the EU's population remains at a sustainable level.  
Conclusions 
The fertility rate trend prospects show a positive attitude, but it is still so far from the necessary 
maintaining 2.1, and so far from the concept of sustainability: maintainable for generations. From a 
human resources’ view, to improve the demographic numbers, it is important to encourage young 
people between 25-35 years to have children. Introduction of housing supports and family tax benefits 
according to the number of children are positive examples. The problem here is – the same as above 
– to establish the necessary public financial background through general taxation. Sadly, the 
idealisation of having children is missing at national and EU level, there is no adequate publicity 
(propaganda), and the present results of childbirth promotion campaign activities are negligible, but 
still some initiations can be found (Spies, 2016). Researches prove that an increase of family 
allowances by 25 % would increase the fertility level by 0.5-0.6 % in a short term, and by 4 % in a 
long term, and so over time (approx. 20 years) the necessary budget funds can be created (Gauthier, 
A. H. & Hatzius, J., 1997, p. 51 and Zhang, J. & Quan, J. & Van Meerbergen, P., 1994, p. 29). Other 
compelling incentives are sanction, like the taxation of the childlessness. Although this might provide 
revenue for the state, but it is not certain that it would solve the demographic problem. In addition, a 
further – although in the west and/or liberal world controversial – solution is birth control, particularly 
tightening the conditions for contraception and induced abortions, but it is worth mentioning that 
health risks can occur here (Klick, J. & Sven, N. & Stratmann, T. 2012).  
In relation with these it must be considered that, even if the demographic policy is successful, the 
effects will only be felt after one generation, and at least twice as many time is required for converting 
the pension system into a fully funded one. The most pressing and urgent question is bridging the 
next two or three decades. 
Theoretically the assumption should say that in the countries where the tertiary educational attainment 
higher the fertility rate is lower, since youngsters and women are not taking children. But according 
to the next figure, it shows where the higher educational attainment rates bear higher results, the 
fertility rates are better e.g. in the case of France, Sweden, United Kingdom, Ireland, Finland. The 
observation cannot be a principle because there are controversies e.g. Cyprus, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, or on the other hand Italy, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Romania.  
 
Figure 14 
Population (%) aged 30-34 with tertiary educational attainment and fertility, EU-28, 2015 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2016 
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 Even the connection between the GDP and the total fertility rate (TFR) is controversial, since in 31 
European countries the economic crisis spread in 2009, while decreases in fertility became a common 
feature in Europe with a time lag (Lanzieri, 2013, p. 2). 
 
Figure 15 
Number of countries by year-on-year change of GDP and TFR 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2016 
 
The European public education systems face several challenges. The low fertility rate in long-term 
will occurs the lack of people who are attaining to education. In the case of higher education this 
problem will arise later thank to the fashion and the requirement of lifelong learning mechanism. The 
result of this trend, the vocational, specialised, post-graduate, doctorial education etc. continuously 
support the tertiary education level, and according to the (labour market) expectations, there will be 
demand for academic education. According to the Europe 2020 forecasts, the skills required by the 
labour market up to 2025 underline the importance of higher education. Between 2013 and 2025 some 
20 million jobs requiring medium or high qualifications are expected to be created, whereas at the 
same time low-qualified jobs will fall by about 12 million. In accordance with this, to support the 
maintenance and improvement of the European tertiary education, and the educational attaining level 
there are several significant decisions in the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
 
But after one or two generations, corresponding to the present forecasts in 2050 there will be only 
400 million people in the Europe, which means a 100 million decrease. Despite the rate of tertiary 
educational attainment will rise, the denominator (society, population) of the fraction will be 
significantly less, therefore the absolute result can be a little better, but this 100 million decrease 
overly enormous to balance the lack only with some percent.  
In the point of fiscal and financial view, education is getting to transform rather to a long-term 
financial investment project, since educational attainment strongly influences successful participation 
in the labour market. In addition, the student credit systems will increase, and as a consequence of 
this, the banking system will adopt to this new potential client, borrower and debtor base.  
 
 
  
 Figure 16 
Indicators and concepts and their links to the headline indicators on education 
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